Unresolvable Questions?
No, this is not going to be a blog post about solid stream and fog nozzles… That argument has been ongoing since the 1800s and is quite likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Systems of Work
However, there are a number of other interesting differences in perspective that are worth examining. In the interest of full disclosure, I have been a Blue Card certified IC Instructor since 2015. Based on my education, training, and experiences in diverse fire service organizations serving rural, suburban, and urban communities, I find that an incident management system that provides clarity of strategy and coordinated tactical operations based on the incident’s critical factors to make the most sense. This is an effective and efficient way to manage fireground operations. Others have a different perspective. The following quote is from a recent post on social media.
Why does Blue Card default to the 2nd due apparatus to Level 1 [Stage], wait for an assignment, lay in and leave a ff [firefighter] at the hydrant and come in for on deck (stage but closer)? How many minutes delay does this add & increase risk of injuries & death for all. This is terrible, inefficient operation. They [Blue Card] are purposely [emphasis added] delaying firefighters from searching & being inside to mitigate a mayday… How long does your department level 1 stage as the second, third, fourth due unit?
Let’s unpack this. The first question is really asking several different things. The first relates to the concept and use of “Level 1 Staging”, the second is about putting companies “On-Deck” and the third is asking about water supply tactics.
Tactical Assignments and Apparatus Positioning
First things first. There are several ways to address company assignments and positioning at structure fires. Over the course of my career, as a firefighter, company officer, and chief officer, I have worked in organizations that used each of them or a combination of these methods.
Self-Assignment: Companies proceed directly to the incident location position where they choose (usually as close to the incident as they can get) and may receive an assignment from the IC or self-assign based on what they think needs to be done. This system of work often results in chaos, freelancing, and a lack of accountability.
Standard Operating Procedures/Order of Arrival Assignment: Companies position and assume roles and functions based on the kind of resource and their order of arrival at the incident (or order of anticipated arrival). For example, first arriving engine begins fire attack and the first arriving truck or heavy rescue (special service unit) begins search. When the operating environment and typical fire conditions are consistent, this system of work can be effective (until someone arrives out of order or conditions are substantially different than typical).
Companies arriving “out of order” is occassionaly cited as an issue in firefighter line of duty death and near miss reports in agencies using an SOP driven, order of arrival procedure for apparatus positioning and tactical assignments. For example, “This caused companies to arrive outside of the normal and expected order. Some personnel reported that this caused confusion regarding their assignments during the initial moments of the incident” (BCoFD, 2024, p. 35). This issue is often mentioned, but rarely, if ever is the issue of pre-defined tactical assignments identified as a problem (as the agencies that use this system see the issue as arriving out of order, not a flaw in SOP driven, order or arrival assignment.
Level I Staging and Critical Factors Based Assignments by the IC
The first arriving company proceeds to the incident location (and may or may not establish their own water supply depending on the incident’s crtitical factors). All other companies Level 1 Stage. Here is a key point of misunderstanding. What is Level 1 Staging? The basic concept is to advise the IC that you are “Level 1” before you have passed your last tactical option. For example, in hydranted areas, engines will typically announce that they are Level 1 prior to passing the closest hydrant to the incident in their direction of travel. Ladder companies (or other special service units) will announce that they are Level 1 prior to committing past an option to access other sides of the building (if this is an option). When there is an immediate tactical need identified by the IC, companies reporting that they are Level 1 are unlikely to fully stop their apparatus but will continue directly to their assignment. Also, if a company observes an immediate tactical need such as a person in a window in need of immediate rescue, they can self-assign and advise the IC to maintain accountability.
The first arriving company officer as IC #1 sizes-up the incident (and continues to do so), selects (and maintains) an appropriate strategy , and makes tactical assignments based on the incident’s critical factors. This ensures that resources are depoloyed in a timely and efficient manner to address the most critical needs. To answer the question of how long units remain Level 1 staged, it depends. Early in incident operations, this may be zero seconds, later arriving units may remain Level 1 Staged if they are not needed for a tactical assignment providing tactical reserve in depth.
On-Deck
What is “On-Deck” and when in the sequence of tactical operations are companies given this assignment. Companies assigned as on-deck first and foremost have the capability to deploy for firefighter rescue (e.g., rapid intervention). Within the context of Blue Card, companies are not given a static assignment as a “Rapid Intervention Team” or “Rapid Intervention Crew”, rather companies assigned as on-deck are a readily available tactical reserve, usually positioned near the point(s) of entry who are ready for the next tactical assignment or relief of operating crews and who maintain the capability to serve in a rapid intervention role if needed.
Now comes the wrinkle. Within the context of Blue Card training and simulations, companies are not assigned to on-deck until all immediate tactical needs have been addressed. Once immediate needs are addressed, the IC begins to build “three deep” tactical deployment with companies working, on-deck, and staged to address potential changes in incident conditions, relief of operating crews, or response to a mayday.
That said, fire and rescue agencies have a legal obligation to comply with relevant occupational safety and health regulations related to structural firefighting. In this case the requirements for “two-in/two-out” specified by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Respiratory Protection Standard (or equivalent state occupational safety and health regulations).
1910.134(g)(4) Procedures for interior structural firefighting. In addition to the requirements set forth under paragraph (g)(3), in interior structural fires, the employer shall ensure that:
1910.134(g)(4)(i) At least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and remain in visual or voice contact with one another at all times;
1910.134(g)(4)(ii) At least two employees are located outside the IDLH atmosphere; and
1910.134(g)(4)(iii) All employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.
Note 1 to paragraph (g): One of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander in charge of the emergency or safety officer, so long as this individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at the incident.
Note 2 to paragraph (g): Nothing in this section is meant to preclude firefighters from performing emergency rescue activities before an entire team has assembled.
While not carrying the weight of a regulation, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (2021) NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program conveys similar requirements for fireground operations:
8.6.4 * Members operating in hazardous areas at emergency incidents shall operate in crews of two or more.
8.6.7 In accordance with the requirements of 8.8.2, at least two members shall be present outside the hazardous area available for assistance or rescue at emergency operations where members are operating inside a hazardous area.
8.8.2 * In the initial stages of an incident where only one crew is operating in the hazardous area at a working structural fire, a minimum of four individuals shall be required, consisting of two members working as a crew in the hazardous area and two standby members present outside this hazardous area available for assistance or rescue at emergency operations where entry into the danger area is required.
8.8.2.1 The “initial stages” of an incident shall encompass the tasks undertaken by the first arriving company with only one crew assigned or operating in the hazardous area.
8.8.2.2 The standby members shall be responsible for maintaining a constant awareness of the number and identity of members operating in the hazardous area, their location and function, and time of entry.
A reasonable argument can be made that the requirements for two-in/two-out are not based on evidence, and do not appreciably increase the safety of firefighters during the initial stages of incident operations. However, until these regulations and standards are changed, fire and rescue agencies can, and have been held accountable for non-compliance. This creates a significant challenge and in many cases a moral dilemma for crews operating on the fireground. More to follow on this in a subsequent blog post addressing risk management on the fireground.\
The concept of “on-deck” and “three deep deployment” was an outgrowth of the Phoenix Fire Department’s recovery from Brett Tarver’s line-of-duty death. Extensive training and drills on rapid intervention determined that the traditional use of “rapid intervention teams” was ineffective and that use of one or more on-deck companies provided a greater flexibility and responsiveness when responding to tactical requirements and firefighter maydays.
Water Supply
With water supply as with many other tactical operations on the fireground, context matters. The argument against having the first arriving engine establishing their own water supply is often supported by Underwriters Laboratories Fire Safety Research Institute (UL FSRI) research that demonstrated the efficacy of quick water on the fire and that fires involving one and two room fires in single family homes and fires in small apartments could be extinguished with less than several hundred gallons of water, less than that typically carried in the water tank of engine company apparatus (Zevotek, Stakes,& Willi, 2018; Regan, Bryant, & Weinschenk, 2020; & Stakes, Bryant, Dow, Regan, & Weinschenk, 2020).
This research provides a solid case for having the first arriving engine attack the fire using tank water and having a later arriving company establish a continuous water supply when dealing with contents fires in small single-family homes and apartments. This may or may not extend to fires that have grown from contents fires to structural fires as well as larger homes and commercial or industrial occupancies. Other considerations on who establishes a continuous water supply include company level staffing, weight of the first alarm assignment (how many companies), timing of arrival, and the nature of the water supply (closely spaced fire hydrants, hydrant flow and pressure, rural water supply, etc.). Quick water on the fire is important, but context is critical. Water supply like all other tactical operations depends on the fixed and variable critical factors presented by the incident.
Purpose and Intent
Illinois State University Professor Joseph Zompetti authored a book titled Divisive Discourse: The Extreme Rhetoric of Contemporary American Politics examining how ordinary, common people communicate about politics and the communications phenomenon of polarization. Divisiveness, polarization and extreme rhetoric are not limited to the political sphere and are common in today’s fire service as well.
They [Blue Card] are purposely [emphasis added] delaying firefighters from searching & being inside to mitigate a mayday…
Is this a true statement? Really? It is easy to make assumptions about others motives but without considerable work it is often difficult to really understand the purpose and intent of what others do. I suspect that individuals on all sides of the questions addressed in this blog post would agree with the following:
- Quick and effective water on the fire has a positive impact on occupant and firefighter safety as well as protection of the building and its contents from the fire.
- Rapid and effective search for occuants and isolation of trapped occupants from the fire and removal of those occupants while minimizing exposure to toxic and thermal insult improves their chance of survival.
- Ventilation coordinated with isolation and fire control increases the effectiveness of search and fire control operations and reduces the risk to occupants and firefighters.
- Effective apparatus positioning increases the effectiveness of firefighting operations.
- Companies who understand strategy and their tactical assignments at a structure fire are more effective and safer.
The questions should not be what does “right” look like but should be what does “excellent” look like and how do we define it within our own operational context. There may be (and often are) more than one answer!
References
Joseph Zompetti (2018). Divisive discourse: the extreme rhetoric of contemporary American politics. Solana Beach, CA: Cognella Academic Publishing
29 Code of Federal Reguations 1910.134 respiratory protection. Retrieved July 21, 2025, from https://bit.ly/44ZwJMA.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (2021) NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program. Quincy, MA: Author.
Zevotek, R., Stakes, K. & Willi, J. (2018). Impact of fire attack utilizingi and exterior streams on firefighter safety and occupant survival: full scale experiments. Retrieved July 21, 2025, from https://bit.ly/3GK3a9D.
Regan, R., Bryant, J., & Weinschenk, C. (2020). Analysis of the coordination of suppression and ventilation in single-family homes. Retrieved July 21, 2025, from https://bit.ly/4o0ktnA.
Stakes, K., Bryant, B., Dow, N., Regan, J. & Weinschenk, C. (2020). Analysis of the coordination of suppression and ventilation in multi-family dwellings. Retrieved July 21, 2025, from https://bit.ly/44GkiGn.
Baltimore County Fire Department (BCoFD). (2024b). After action review report commercial building fire with mayday. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://bit.ly/3TLYp1B.